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TOWARD 'NEW PROPERTY' AND 'NEW
SCHOLARSHIP': AN ASSESSMENT OF
CANADIAN PROPERTY SCHOLARSHIP
By MARY JANE MOsSMAN*
While the particular nature of property law makes both the undertaking of property
scholarship and its assessment difficult Professor Mossman finds that the general
question essential to any assessment of legal scholarship remains the same that
is, the underlying methodological inquiry. An analysis of three topics in property
law - the doctrine of estates in lan4 landlord and tenan and matrimonial
property - reveals a lack of contextual awareness in the legal writing. If the principles
of property law are to be sufficiently dynamic to provide protection for 'new property'
claims, legal scholars must develop a critical awareness of the values and choices
that underlie the scholarly inquiry.
I. APPROACHING THE TASK: PROBLEMS AND PITFALLS
Twenty years ago, in the preface to his casebook, Cases and Notes
on Land Law,, Professor Laskin (as he then was) quoted and agreed
with a statement of Professor Hargreaves, written in 1956,2 assessing
the state of property scholarship; Hargreaves had asserted:
Not since Littleton has there been a serious attempt to isolate [the principles of
English land law] from their historic origin, to examine them as living contributions
to contemporary thought, and to apply them in the construction of a systematic
analysis of the whole field which would satisfy the demands of scientific juris-
prudence and prove worthy of the greatest system of property law that the world
has ever known.3
Hargreaves' assertion was an assessment of property scholarship in
England, and Laskin was even less enthusiastic about the state of property
scholarship in Canada at that time:
§ Copyright, 1985, Mary Jane Mossman.
* Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. The author is
grateful for research assistance provided by Ms. Theresa Mcpherson, Law 1986, Osgoode Hall
Law School, and patient re-typing by Ms. Kasandra Sharpe.
' B. Laskin, Cases and Notes on Land Law (1964).
2 A. Hargreaves, Book Review (1956) 19 Mod. L. Rev. 14; Professor Hargreaves was reviewing
Cheshire's Real Property, 7th ed., lamenting "the present position of land law studies and ...
the neglect into which its basic principles have fallen." Ibid. at 25.
3 Ibid quoted in supra, note 1 at v.
4 Supra, note 1 at v-vi.
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There has been nothing in Canada comparable to the English texts, let alone
those in the United States (where there is a proliferation of general casebooks
and specialized treatises as well). We have to go back to Armour's second edition
of Real Property, 1916, to find any general treatment of the subject, and this
is a work which, basically, is founded on Blackstone. We will get no farther than
Armour unless it be by the efforts of the law teachers, to whom Professor Hargreaves
feels England too will have to look for any systematic study of basic land law
problems. 4
Twenty years after Laskin so stated the challenge to the law teachers,
the question is whether the state of property scholarship in Canada has
fundamentally changed, or even changed at all.
The answer to this question requires an assessment of property
scholarship in Canada. This task is a daunting one for a number of
reasons. First, "property and civil rights" are a matter within provincial
jurisdiction under the Canadian Constitutions any assessment of property
scholarship should therefore take account of published work in several
different provincial jurisdictions. Moreover, unlike some other areas of
law that also fall within provincial legislative jurisdiction, property laws,
especially those in relation to land law, often differ greatly from one
province to another depending on the time of reception of English law;
the Torrens registration systems 6 of the four western provinces make
land law and procedure very different from those in the east, while the
civil law system in Quebec is based on concepts very different in theory
from those of the common law provinces.? The provincial nature of
property law thus complicates an assessment of property scholarship,
to a greater extent perhaps than some other areas of law.
A second difficulty in the task of assessing property scholarship
is that property law is more dependent upon statutes than upon common
law principles. However, unlike some other areas of law that are essentially
statute-based8 the framework of property law depends upon statutes often
enacted several centuries ago;9 the task of interpreting and applying
statutes may thus depend upon both an understanding of the context
4 Supra, note 1 at v-vi.
5 Section 92(13) of the Constitution Act 1867, 30-31 Vict., c. 3, as am. item I of Sched.
to the Constitution Act 1982, Sched. B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
6 The Torrens system of land registration was introduced in the four western provinces from
its origins in Australia. For an excellent review of its origins and significant principles, see T.
Mapp, Torrens' Elusive Tle (1978).
7 The civil law system is based on allodial ownership while the common law system is based
on tenure. See J.G. Castel, The Civil Law System of the Province of Quebec (1962).
8 For example, the law of taxation and labour law are both substantially statute-based.
9 The most (in)famous may be the Statute of Uses, 1535, 27 Hen. 8, c. 10, although there
are others with long antecedents like the Statute of Frauds, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 3. Even statutes
like the Wills Act, 1540, 32 Hen. 8, c. 1, present difficulties because they have been frequently
amended.
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in which the legislation was originally enacted, as well as creativity in
its use in a modem context. This process is further complicated by the
need to take account of common law principles that have developed
interstitially when outdated legislation has not been repealed, despite
wholly failing to meet modem needs.1o
This difficulty is compounded by the absence, at least until recently,
of any constitutional principles overtly protecting property interests. Unlike
the United States,, Canada has had no constitutionally entrenched rights
to property that override enacted legislation. The advent of constitutionally
entrenched rights and freedoms in the Charter,2 created demands for
extending such protection to property. 3 Although property protection has
been expressly omitted to date from the Charter,,, it has been suggested
that this does not prevent full protection, either pursuant to section 7
of the Charter or by reason of a "common law" right.s
Thus property scholarship must take account of statutes, both ancient
and modem, which are interwoven with common-law principles; as well,
it must accommodate a background of ideas, often only implicit, about
the constitutional protection of property interests. The tasks of enunciating
the law and demonstrating the efficacy of its application in a particular
context may be overwhelming in themselves; and these difficulties may
provide at least a partial explanation for the absence of property
scholarship that advances beyond explication of this sort. Moreover, the
combination of provincial jurisdiction over property and the nature of
property law analysis - an amalgam of statutes, common law, and
constitutional principles - makes the task a daunting one indeed.
10 There are a number of examples that could be used to illustrate this problem. Perhaps
the best is the Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 240 and the doctrine of adverse possession.
' The Fifth amendment of the U.S. Constitution prevents any "taking" of "property" without
due process. See B. Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution (1977).
12 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as the Charter) is
Part I (ss. 1-34) of the Constitution Act 1982, Sched. B. of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11.
'3 See, for example, G. Brandt, "Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms - Right to Property
as an Extension of Personal Security - Status of Undeclared Rights" (1983) 61 Can. B. Rev.
398; P. Hogg, Canada Act 1982 Annotated (1982) at 27; and J. Whyte, "Fundamental Justice:
The Scope and Application of Section 7 of the Charter" (1983) 13 Man. LJ. 455.
"4 There have been a number of suggestions that an amendment may be appropriate.
15 See Re Fisherman's Wharf Ltd (1982), 44 N.B.R. (2d) 201 affing (1982), 40 N.B.R. (2d)
42 (Q.B.). In the Court of Appeal, Mr. Justice La Forest reviewed the general principles of
constitutional history and stated at 211:
Those who struggled to wrest power from the Stuart Kings and placed it in the hands of
the elected representatives of the people were not of a mind to replace one despot with
another. Rather they were guided by a philosophy that placed a high premium on individual
liberty and private property and that philosophy continues to inform our fundamental political
arrangements - our Constitution. [Emphasis added.]
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However, there is also a third and even more telling reason why
the task of assessing property scholarship is so difficult. This reason is
the scope of 'property analysis'.16 From the perspective of legal philosophy,
'property' is a concept, not a thing, and moreover it is a concept that
evolves and changes according to the societal context:
The meaning of property is not constant. The actual institution, and the way people
see it, and hence the meaning they give to the word, all change over time ....
The changes are related to changes in the purposes which society or the dominant
classes in society expect the institution of property to serve. 17
Using this approach, the scope of property analysis includes not
only the traditional categories of property interests - land, chattels, non-
possessory interests, leaseholds, and so forth - but also other categories
of "new property,"is including government benefits and jobs;19 such an
approach might also include an assessment of categories of interests in
which proprietary interests are no longer recognized, such as slaves,
children, or wives.o Clearly, the adoption of the concept of property
used in legal philosophy makes any assessment of property scholarship
a difficult if not impossible task.
An alternative and more pragmatic approach to defining the scope
of property analysis may be the use of 'property' subject headings in
the Index to Canadian Legal Periodical Literature.2, However, even this
approach evidences the great breadth of scope for property analysis.
Although the subject headings have changed to some extent over the
period 1960-1984,22 a very large number have remained generally in
use throughout the period: adverse possession; chattel mortgages; city
planning; community property, condominium, and cooperative housing;
16 Faced with the task of reviewing 'property cases' in the Supreme Court of Canada for
the annual Supreme Court Law Review, all the property editors have conceded problems of
determining the boundaries of 'property analysis'. See B. Bucknall, "Developments in Property Law:
The 1978-79 and 1979-80 Terms" (1981) 2 Supreme Court L. Rev. 279 at 279-81; T. Youdan,
"Developments in Property Law: The 1981-82 Term" (1983) 5 Supreme Court L. Rev. 255; and
MJ. Mossman, "Developments in Property Law: The 1983-84 Term" (1985) 7 Supreme Court
L. Rev. 355.
17 C.B. MacPherson, Property: Mainstream and Critical Positions (1978) at 1.
Is See C. Reich, "The New Property" (1964) 73 Yale Li. 733; S. Williams, "Liberty and
Property: The Problem of Government Benefits" (1983) 12 J. Leg. Stud. 3; and M.A. Glendon,
The New Family and the New Property (198 1).
19 See also M. MacNeil, "Property in the Welfare State" (1983) 7 Dal. Li. 343.
20 See Johnston v. Hamblet, 1815, Catterall, vol. 2, at 27, and other cases referred to in P.
Lucie, "Marriage and Law Reform in Nineteenth-Century America" in E. Craik, ed., Marriage
and Property (1984) 138 at 153-57.
21 The Index to Canadian Legal Periodical Literature was reviewed for the period 1960-1984
under the listed headings.
22 For further details of these changes, see text at 638-39.
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conveyancing; copyright; dower, easements; estate planning; expropri-
ation; family law; forfeiture; fraudulent conveyances; future interests;
homesteads; housing; husband and wife; immovables; implied trusts;
inheritance and succession; inheritance, estate and gift taxes; intellectual
property; joint tenancy; landlord and tenant; leases; marriage; property;
mortgages; movables; perpetuities; personal property; lost goods; pledges;
possessions; property (civil law); property taxes; public lands; pollution;
natural resources; real estate agents; real property covenants; regional
planning; restraints on alienation; secured transactions; title to land;
Torrens system; trusts and trustees; vendors and purchasers; water
pollution; wills; and zoning.23 The breadth of 'property' topics, even using
the more pragmatic approach of the Index, is still overwhelming and
makes any attempt to assess 'property' scholarship a challenging one
indeed.
These same problems, which make an assessment of property
scholarship so difficult, also operate to make it difficult to undertake
property scholarship per se in Canada. A legal scholar who works in
the property area is much more likely to be a specialist in municipal
zoning, or charitable trusts, or matrimonial property;24 he or she is much
less likely to be interested in drawing connections and pointing out similar
themes among these categories, assuming such connections and similar
themes even exist any longer. Indeed, the startling conclusion may be
that what is property is now so diverse that the concept is no longer
useful, except as a starting point for analyses that are completely divergent
depending on the special context.2 5 If this is so, the usefulness of the
property concept as a means of extending legal protection to 'new property'
interests may also be in doubt. For both these reasons, it seems important
to assess the potential for property scholarship more generally.
Bearing in mind the difficulties that have been identified, and
particularly the breadth of scope, which defies complete mastery by any
single scholar, it seems nonetheless important to try to identify some
of the trends in Canadian legal scholarship in property since Laskin's
casebook was published in 1964. In doing so, it may be possible to
identify some of the strengths as well as the weaknesses of the work
to date, and to suggest directions for scholarly inquiry for the future.
23 Lists of entries for these headings are on file with the author.
24 Names of authors generally associated with property scholarship usually appear in only
one category; for example, the names of McClean, Waters, and Sheard appear frequently in relation
to charitable trusts, but not in relation to municipal zoning or matrimonial property.
25 See Bucknall and Youdan, supra, note 16.
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II. PROPERTY SCHOLARSHIP: A PRELIMINARY APPRAISAL
A. Overview
The task of appraising legal scholarship in the property context seems
to require, first, an overview of the scholarly work produced by lawyers
and legal academics and then, some comparison of this work to that
produced by scholars of property in Canada, or by legal and other scholars
elsewhere. In drawing comparisons, it may be useful to consider whether
the work26 is essentially doctrinal (explaining the law and its application
in the legal context); normative (assessing implicit or underlying values
according to expressly stated policy or criteria); comparative (comparing
the law and its functions in different contexts or jurisdictions); or
interdisciplinary (examining the law in its social, political, or economic
context). It may also be of use to consider whether the intended audience
for scholarly work on property includes persons other than law students,
academic colleagues, practicing lawyers, or judges.
In this framework, the legal scholarly work on property topics listed
in the Index to Canadian Legal Periodical Literature for the years 1960-
1984 might be assessed as follows. First, the total number of entries
is very substantial due to the scope of the property concept; however,
the number of entries for any single subject heading is usually not excessive.
Second, the entries are specialized by topic rather than general in focus,
and authors' names seem to recur in relation to specialized topic headings
rather than appearing in relation to more than one property topic.27 Third,
the entries seem to be essentially doctrinal; they explain a particular
legal development in terms of earlier cases or statutory provisions, and
sometimes present a new decision in the context of overall doctrinal
development. Finally, the intended audience for most of the writing seems
to be lawyers, whether students, academics, practitioners, or judges; there
is no pervasive sense of a framework for analysis outside the legal system
itself.28
At the same time, the list of entries in the Index discloses some
interesting developments. Beginning in the early 1970s, the Index included
two new titles: 'environmental control' and 'industrial property'.29 At this
time, there was also a noticeable increase in the number of entries for
26 In the property field, the published work includes treatises and articles, Law Reform
Commission Reports, Law Society Lectures, and CBA Continuing Education Programs. It also
seems useful to include (at least published) teaching materials.
27 Supra, note 24.
28 The titles of many articles suggest a precise focus on a very specific topic.
29 See Index 1971-74.
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some topic headings including 'copyright', 'landlord and tenant', 'marriage:
property', 'pollution', and 'regional planning'; at the same time, there
was, for example, a decrease in the number of entries for 'personal
property'.30 Although it would be inappropriate to form any significant
conclusions from such a quantitative analysis alone, it is perhaps note-
worthy that the legal periodical literature seems to reflect, at least in
quantitative terms, attentiveness by legal scholars to some of the con-
troversial property issues of the past two decades.
Beyond quantitative analysis, however, how should property scho-
larship be appraised? What are the critical elements and how should
we determine when the standard has been met? This question is both
necessary and interesting, driving us to the heart of scholarly inquiry:
how to ask the right question. Inevitably, the act of assessing scholarly
writing requires a determination of criteria for assessment. Yet the process
of defining appropriate criteria itself provokes critical questions about
how all the possible factors can be assembled, how a selection of factors
can be identified, and how these factors can be applied fairly to the
literature in order to reach a conclusion about the state of property
scholarship in Canada. Indeed, the really significant point about a
Symposium on Canadian Scholarship is not the debate about the relative
merits of different kinds of scholarly writing in Canada, but the underlying
methodological inquiry: how do we decide the relative merits?
This question is a provocative one in the context of legal writing.
It is generally accepted that legal writing as a form of writing is reasoned,
logical, and precise. Notwithstanding this perception however, many
lawyers both in practice and in academe recognize that judicial decisions
are usually affected by judges' values, beliefs, and assumptions; thus,
the reasoned argument of judges' decisions is best understood in light
of such unstated factors in their legal writing. What is then surprising
is the apparent lack of awareness in scholarly legal writing of the
significance of the writers' perspectives. If asking the right question is
important to the scholarly method, then it must be important as well
to know why a legal writer has concluded that the question posed is
the right one.
The point of this discussion is to suggest that most Canadian legal
writing in property law reflects little interest in the methodology of its
inquiry; it is a 'closed' system in which persons with legal training first
read the reasoned arguments of other persons who are legally trained
and then critique the reasoning or the logic or the precision of the writing:
30 Ibid.
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Legal scholarship is in fact a sophisticated and elaborated form of legal brief.
Doctrinal analysis, the chief method for legal scholarship, is undertaken to establish
a particular interpretation of case law on the basis of arguments and authority
which would be acceptable to an appellate judge. As a method of inquiry,
conventional legal scholarship serves the narrow professional function of supporting
lawyers' advocacy?'
Of course, such writing may be defended on the basis that it is useful
and that legal writers may provide assistance through such efforts. The
question here, however, is whether such writing can be regarded as
scholarly in terms of its method of inquiry.
This question is fuelled by the critiques of legal method expressed
most recently both by the critical legal studies movement3 2 and by
feminists.33 In both cases, the critiques have centred on the liberal bias
inherent in the law's rationality and logic. Moreover, feminism has focused
very systematically on methodology and has developed a compelling
critique of the law's "point-of-view-lessness"3 and, arguably, also of its
use by legal scholars. In this context, it seems desirable to face up to
the question of method in scholarly inquiry: "How can one do critical
scholarship without questioning conventional methods? How can one
do critical scholarship without considering one's role as a scholar engaged
in a social enterprise?"3s And we can add: How can one assess scholarship
on property without addressing these same questions?
These questions do not have easy answers. At the very least, they
seem to require a statement about perspective from an assessor of legal
scholarship. Since I am interested in law as a central element in social
relations among people, I am primarily interested in whether scholarly
writing about law addresses such process questions as follow about the
creation, interpretation, and application of the law:
- How were legal principles adopted, or why are they appropriate,
having regard to the 'outside world' as well as the 'closed system'
of the law?
31 F. Munger & Seron, "Critical Legal Studies versus Critical Legal Theory: A Comment
on Method" [1984] Law and Policy 257 at 260. Perhaps a good example is A.H. Oosterhoff &
W.B. Rayner, Anger and Honsberger Real Property, 2d ed. (1985), in which the authors express
the hope in their preface that they have made the intricacies of the law of real property "more
accessible to the profession."
32 See Munger & Seron, !bid and the work of R. Unger, as well as D. Kairys, ed., The Politics
of Law (1982).
33 See C. MacKinnon, "Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist Juris-
prudence" (1984) 8 Signs 635; and C. Menkle-Meadow, "Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations
on a Woman's Lawyering Process" (Address to the Law and Society Association, June 1984).
34 The phrase is C. MacKinnon's. See Munger & Seron, supra, note 31, for a critique of
methodology in the critical legal studies movement.
35 Munger & Seron, supra, note 31 at 258.
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- How can we explain the cases 'at the margin' as well as those
in the mainstream; are legal decisions useful as legitimating forces
for the mainstream?
- Why are some problems beyond law or outside the boundaries
of legal decision making and what factors make them so?
In choosing to adopt these kinds of questions for an assessment, I will
find doctrinal explication less meritorious than legal writing that pursues
these broader issues.36 The critical issue remains: what is fundamental
to scholarly inquiry is the how and why for the choice of questions,
and not the answers.
B. The Development of Property Analysis
As a starting point for my inquiry, I have chosen to examine three
topics in property law:
1. The doctrine of estates in land;
2. Landlord and tenant; and
3. Matrimonial property.
These three areas represent different stages in the development of property
analysis. The first is a topic with ancient origins and few modem
developments; the second is a topic with medieval beginnings but dramatic
changes in the twentieth century, and the last is a topic that has emerged
in its modem form within the last decade or so. What follows is a
preliminary assessment of some of the scholarship in light of the questions
posed.
1. The doctine of estates in land
This topic has not been one of significant controversy in the past
two decades, even though it is obviously what both Hargreaves and Laskin
had in mind when, in the quotations at the beginning of this essay3 7
they directed the attention of law reformers and legal scholars to further
efforts. In fact, most of the legal scholarship about the doctrine of estates
in land appears in casebooks38 or texts39 for use by law students. For
example, Laskin's casebook of 1964 includes a brief introduction to the
nature of feudalism and the doctrine of estates, as well as legal and
36 See Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law, Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council, Law and Learning (Chair H.W. Arthurs) (1983), for an analysis of types of
research in law (esp. ch. 5).
37 Supra. notes 3 & 4.
38 See for example, supra note 1 and D. Mendes da Costa & R. Balfour, Property Law (1982).
39 See for example, A. Sinclair, Introduction to Real Property Law (1982); and Oosterhoff &
Rayner, supra; note 31.
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equitable interests in land. The material includes excerpts from treatises,40
statutory provisions, and cases. Some of the material,, places the legal
concepts in a broader socio-political context, but the main focus is the
enunciation of legal doctrine. By comparison, a more recent student
casebook, Properly Law,,2 contains a greater amount of descriptive
material, along with statutory and case excerpts; however, it is not much
more successful than Laskin's casebook was in placing the legal concepts
in a socio-political context43
There are three criticisms that can be directed at these casebooks
and texts. The first is that they misrepresent the variety of legal ideas
that flourished in the medieval period, when the basic concepts of modern
land law were being established. The history is usually presented as an
inexorable drive to universal fee simple estates held in free and common
socage tenure." The work of medievalists is ignored in this process, even
though some of them have clearly demonstrated the diversity and creativity
within feudalism and its legal concepts,4 for example, widows, who were
systematically excluded from land ownership by the doctrines of tenure
and primogeniture, nonetheless, often succeeded in their objectives of
keeping the family and the land intact.46 The legal scholarship, by contrast,
analyses the history of developing legal concepts in terms of modern
ideas, particularly those that have been successful or become dominant,
and ignores the variety of concepts or ideas, some of which were quite
flourishing at the relevant time.
40 For example, R. Powell, Real Property (1949); and H. Bigelow, Introduction to the Law
of Real Property, 3d ed. (1945).
41 The excerpts from Powell, ibid, attempt to assess the pervasive political, social, and economic
organization of feudalism. Yet the accuracy of the historical scholarship may be criticized for its
efforts to equate the perspective of William the Conqueror in 1066 with that of men [sic] today.
Powell asserts that the "ambitious, somewhat ruthless seeker of power" in the eleventh century
became William the Conqueror, whereas in our century, such a person becomes John D. Rockefeller
or George Eastman; Powell further suggests that other "close analogies are obviously found in
the activities of Germany during the first two or three years of World War II." See supra, note
1 at 7.
42 Supra, note 38.
43 The material is fully descriptive but does not really address the issues of why developments
occurred, why certain actions were brought, and so forth.
44 Both Laskin's casebook and that of Mendes da Costa & Balfour assign relatively little weight
to copyhold tenure, for example. See supra, note 1 at 25; Mendes da Costa & Balfour, supra,
note 38 at 315-16. By contrast, see J. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 2d ed. (1979)
at 259 ff.
45 See J. Baker, /bid; E. Britton, The Community of the Vill (1977); M. Tigar & M. Levy,
Law and the Rise of Capitalism (1977); E. Kamenka & R. Neale, eds., Feudalisn Capitalism and
Beyond (1975); and C. Lis & H. Soly, Poverty and Capitalism in Pre-Industrial Europe (1979).
46 See S. Sheridan Walker, "Widow and Ward: The Feudal Law of Child Custody in Medieval
England" in S. Mosher Stuard, Women in Medieval Society (1976) at 159.
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If the only result were inaccuracy in legal history, that might alone
prompt a reassessment of the scholarship. In addition, however, the
approach of the casebooks generally presents five centuries of devel-
opment of land law concepts as if change occurred in a legal vacuum.47
Although there are usually references to the problems created for Henry
VIII by the widespread existence of conveyances to uses,,4 there is usually
little acknowledgment of the impact of the power struggle between King
and Parliament, or the efforts of Sir Thomas More and others to establish
the Lord Chancellor's role as subject to the rule of law. In the result,
the vision of legal change, and especially its relation to political, economic,
and social factors, is incomplete and often misleading.49
Finally, given the treatment of legal reform during the late medieval
period, when basic legal concepts about land were being developed, it
is hardly surprising that this legal writing virtually ignores the possibility
of land law reform5 With a few exceptions,5 the legal writing evidences
no interest in modem reform of the principles developed under feudalism
in England. Since other possible concepts exist,2 and since conditions
of modem society in Canada differ markedly from those in England
under feudalism, a conscious perception of change and reform in the
legal scholarship of the medieval period would likely result in a conscious
re-examination of the need for legal change in the principles of land
law in modem Canada. However, since such legal changes would affect
not just those holding interests in land, but also those who 'manage'
47 For a contrasting assessment of legal change, see A. Watson, "Legal Change: Sources of
Law and Legal Culture" (1983) 131 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1121.
48 See for example, Mendes da Costa & Balfour, supra, note 38 at 764-65.
49 See supra, note 45. An American scholar writing about future interests has commented:
... the infusion of political and historical paradigms of analysis into the study of law ...
is much more realistic and productive of useful results than is the aridity of idealism, formalism
and wordplay. In short, future interests rules fit together imperfectly not because of the
inability of judges, scholars, or ourselves to be logical, but because different rules arose
at different times due to differing matrices of social and political needs.
See W. Holt, "The Testator Who Gave Away Less Than All He or She Had: Perversions in the
Law of Future Interests" (1980) 32 Ala. L. Rev. 69 at 86.
50 A confidential report was prepared for the Ontario Law Reform Commission by Professor
Mendes da Costa (as he then was) on the Basic Principles of Land Law (1970) recommending
the adoption of allodial land ownership. It was followed by a Second Report (1975) and a Second
Report (Supplemental) in 1976. At about the same time the Commission investigated the possibility
of reforming land registration systems. See Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Land
Registration (1971).
51 A few articles appeared in conjunction with the Commission's Report on Land Registration.
See, for example, R. Risk, "The Records of Title to Land: A Plea for Reform" (1971) 21 U.
Toronto U. 465.
52 See supra, note 7. A good example of such an assessment of principles in relation to both
their historical and modem contexts is D. Cohen, "The Relationship of Contractual Remedies to
Political and Social Status: A Preliminary Inquiry" (1982) 32 U. Toronto LJ. 31.
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the existing system of land law - the lawyers - it has been suggested
that:
A change that made the law simpler or less ambiguous.., could have an adverse
effect on their [lawyers'] income. In addition, the stock-in-trade of a practicing
attorney is his or her knowledge of the existing law. A drastic change could reduce
the most experienced practitioner almost to the level of a beginner.S3
Is Laskin's challenge, therefore, to go unheeded, even by law teachers?
2. Landlord and tenant
In contrast to the problem of estates in land, the legal concepts
of landlord and tenant have been under careful scrutiny during much
of the past two decades. Laskin stated the essential question in his
casebook in 1964:
The pertinent question is to what extent is the transaction regarded as the transfer
of an interest in land (and hence governed by rules and doctrines developed as
part of the law of estates) and to what extent is it regarded as a business dealing(and hence governed by rules and doctrines developed later as part of the law
of contracts). 54
Shortly after stating the issue in this way, Laskin noted without further
comment that "the effect of the domination of property conceptions was
to subordinate the tenant to the landlord."s Virtually nothing in Laskin's
1964 treatment of the subject departed from a basic doctrinal approach
to the subject matter.
By the end of the 1960s, however, law reform proposalss6 regarding
residential leases were significantly altering the legal rights and obligations
of tenants.s Nonetheless, except for the law reform documents, there
is little in the scholarly legal writing of the period that examines the
impetus for the law reform initiatives.8 Nor is there much in the legal
writing after 1970 that assesses the effect or significance of the legal
53 See Watson, supra, note 47 at 1153.
54 Laskin, supra, note I at 180.
55 Ibid. at 181.
56 See for example, Ontario Law Reform Commission, Interim Report on Landlord and Tenant
Law Applicable to Residential Tenancies (1968); and British Columbia Law Reform Commission,
Report on Landlord Tenant Relationships" Residential Tenancies (1973).
57 See for example, the Commission's Report in Ontario, ibid and the provisions of the Landlord
and Tenant Act Part IV, now R.S.O. 1980, c. 232.
5s By way of comparison, in the English context, there is an excellent analysis of the process
and impact of law reform initiatives in the landlord-tenant area in D. Nelken, The Lbnits of the
Legal Process (1983).
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changes introduced by amendments to residential leasehold law across
Canada.59 As the authors of Property Law6o laconically state:
The legal system's treatment of the lease as a conveyance was no doubt sensible
and adequate in a largely agrarian society. ... Subsequent economic and social
developments, however, have rendered inadequate the conception of the lease as
solely a conveyance... 61
There is no real exploration of the nature of the "economic and social
developments" that formed the basis for so fundamental a shift in legal
doctrine.
By contrast, much of the analysis conducted by Ontario's recent
Commission of Inquiry into Residential Tenancies62 was not legal but
economic. It included assessments of the legislative and political back-
ground to the Residential Tenancies Ac4 a statistical description of the
Ontario housing market, a survey of other jurisdictions and of alternative
systems of rent regulation, and computerized simulation models of
financial performance of hypothetical buildings.63 The thrust of the
Commission's inquiry is in stark contrast to most of the legal scholarship
in the landlord-tenant context.
Is the lack of attention in scholarly legal writing to the underlying
economic issues of landlord and tenant law significant? Arguably, the
legal principles may operate without regard to economic consequences,
but it is unlikely that they do so.- Ignoring the underlying economic
principles is likely to distort the analysis of the law of landlord and
tenant, just as ignoring medieval history is likely to result in a distorted
understanding of basic doctrines of land law.
Yet once again, it is not only accuracy that is at stake. The broader
perspective is also needed here to understand the legal change that has
occurred within a few decades in the landlord-tenant context and to
appreciate the possible relationship between legal and social change.65
Landlord and tenant law is, perhaps, a microcosm of the usefulness of
law in the twentieth century as a means of economic regulation, on the
59 Again by way of comparison, in the English context, see M. Partington, Landlord and Tenant
(1975).
60 Supra, note 38.
61 Ibid at 1145.
62 Ontario, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Residential Tenancies; vol. 1 (1984); and
Working Papers, Research Information Bulletins, June 1983 and March 1984.
63 See Research Information Bulletin, June 1983.
64 At the same time, it is unlikely that there is a single explanation for the choices and results
of the application of principles. See Nelken, supra, note 58.
65 See Watson, supra, note 47.
1985]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
one hand, and redistributive justice on the other.66 An English study of
the criminalization of landlord harassment of tenants has been said to:
sow further doubts as to the capacity of law to correct the effects of inequalities
in economic resources to the extent which 'progressive' lawyers had hoped. There
is increasing recognition that law is not a neutral tool that can be employed at
will in the service of Fabian projects of piecemeal social engineering but that
it partakes of and is subject to internal and external constraint in its ability to
achieve social change.67
The challenge for Canadian legal scholarship in landlord-tenant law is
to assess, in the broader context, the neutrality of the law and its inherent
limits.
3. Matrimonial property
If the legal scholarship on land tenures generally ignores the socio-
political context, and the legal scholarship on landlord and tenant law
seems to discount the impact of economic forces, the legal scholarship
on matrimonial property appears imprisoned in both outmoded historical
conceptions and larger economic forces. In some respects, the principles
of matrimonial property present an illustration of property law at the
brink: do the principles really have enough inherent dynamism to be
useful in a radically different context, and if the principles are apt, can
they be applied systematically notwithstanding a hostile economic
context?68
The tension is evident once again in the casebooks. Professor Laskin
considered property relations in marriage in the context of life estates,
which were often created by operation of law through the doctrines of
dower or curtesy for a surviving widow or widower.69 At the time he
was writing, there was a prevailing sense that legal equality had been
substantially achieved for husbands and wives:
The 'property' relations of husband and wife at common law exhibited the disabilities
of the married woman found in other branches of the law, most of which have
now been remedied by legislation and to some extent also by judicial decision.70
66 In the American context, see B. Ackerman, "Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf
of the Poor Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy" (1971) 80
Yale LJ. 1093.
67 Supra, note 58 at 207.
68 The idea of family property as a central concern of modem law is reflected in Glendon,
supra, note 18; and F. Olsen, "The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform"(1983) 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1497.
69 Supra, note 1 at 70-71.
70 Ibid. at 70.
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Two comments can be made. First, there is a sense in Laskin's treatment
that there are no problems remaining in the law's treatment of married
women in relation to property;7, with all the benefit of hindsight, of course,
it is easy to suggest how inadequate this assessment would prove in
the Murdoch case,72 in the Rathwell case,73 and in the drive to reform
'family property' regimes in every province of Canada by the late 1970s.74
Second, matrimonial property seems to sit somewhat uncomfortably in
the midst of life estates; it is as if matrimonial property does not deserve
treatment on its own, but must be 'fitted in' somewhere in the traditional
scheme of things.7s
The treatment of matrimonial property by Mendes da Costa and
Balfour twenty years later demonstrates an awareness of all the intervening
legal developments that have occurred.7 Yet, despite the existence of
a unique statutory framework in Ontario after 1978, 77 the subject of
matrimonial property still receives no separate treatment; instead, it is
'fitted in' interstitially under the subject of co-ownership. Even though
many husbands and wives are co-owners prior to marriage breakdown,
it is the statutory framework of the Family Law Reform Act, and not
the common law principles, that governs property distribution. In this
sense, the Family Law Reform Act probably offers the main principles
for division of property between co-owners, with the common-law
principles applying only in relatively less frequent circumstances.
However, the material is presented in the casebook with the new statutory
framework being 'fitted in' among older legal principles7s
Perhaps because of this choice about the method of presentation,
the underlying values of the reform legislation and the microcosm of
its social and economic context are scarcely addressed. These issues were,
71 There was a sense also among nineteenth-century reformers of married women's property
that legal changes would result in equality for husbands and wives. See L. Holcombe, Wives and
Property (1983); and Lucie, supra, note 20.
72 Murdoch v. Murdoch, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 423.
73 Rathwell v. Rathwel, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 436.
74 Between 1978 and 1980, virtually every province except Quebec enacted special family
property legislation; Quebec also considered new legislation in Bill 89. See A. Bissett-Johnston
& W. Holland, Matrimonial Property Law in Canada (1980).
75 This idea is, of course, consistent with the notion, also urged by those advocating matrimonial
property reform, that the reform sought would not create any major change but merely extend
to women the rights already enjoyed by men. For an early example, see the Declaration of the
Rights of Women (1848).
76 Supra, note 38 at 856 ff.
77 The Family Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 152.
78 This arrangement is traditional when common-law principles are altered by statute; however,
what is suggested here is that the statutory framework is too radical and too comprehensive a
legislative scheme to be 'fitted in' successfully.
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however, generally evident in the reports of federal and provincial law
reform commissions,9 throughout the decade of the seventies. Additionally,
a number of articles in the periodical literature, particularly in recent
years,.o have focused on the inadequacies of the law in achieving equity
in the division of property upon marriage breakdown. Yet there has been
no substantial and fundamental re-thinking in Canadian property scho-
larship of the role of law in allocating wealth between husbands and
wives when marriage ends in divorce.8, The economic analysis of the
male-breadwinner and female-housewife model of marriage has only
infrequently been considered in terms of the legal system's goals and
values.82 It is interesting to speculate whether the creation of entitlement
to family property under the reform legislation has failed to attract the
legal deference usually granted to 'property' (and the legal scholarly
inquiries it deserves) because the idea of family property has made it
available to the many rather than the preserve of the lucky few. If everyone
is 'a man [sic] of property', the value of such property diminishes
accordingly:
In a time of transition, both in family behaviour and in the nature and forms
of wealth, the law is reflecting and interacting with social trends which affect
the majority of persons, primarily those who are at neither the highest nor the
lowest economic levels.83
Is scholarly inquiry less appropriate when the 'property' is 'family
property'?
I. TOWARD BLACKACRE'S NEW HORIZONS...
This review of three areas of scholarly interest within property law
demonstrates a range of different types of analytical problems. In the
context of title to land, the scholarship evidences a lack of contextual
79 See for example, Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Family Law, Part IV (Family
Property Law) (1974); and Law Reform Commission of Canada, Studies on Family Property Law
(1975).
80 For example, see P. Hughes, "The Radical/Reactionary Duality of the Ontario Family Law
Reform Act" (1982), 27 Rep. Fam. L. (2d) 40; and L. Pearlman, "Reforming The Family Law
Reform Act" (1982), 28 Rep. Fam. L. (2d) 63.
81 In the American context, see Olsen, supra, note 68; in the English context, see E. Wilson,
Women and the Welfare State ( 977). There is also an interesting critique from an economic perspective
in H. Gintis, "Social Contradictions and the Liberal Theory of Justice" in R. Skurski, ed., New
Directions in Economic Justice (1983) at 90.
82 See Gintis, ibid. It is noteworthy that such investigations are also being undertaken in the
context of legal history; see for example, E. Spring, "The Family, Strict Settlements and Historians"
in G. Rubin & D. Sugarman, Law Economy and Society, 1750-1914: Essays in the History of English
Law (1984) at 168; and in the context of anthropology, see for example, R. Hirshon, Women and
Property/Women as Property (1984).
83 Glendon, supra, note 18 at 1.
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understanding; this results in a rigidity of thinking about basic concepts
in modem property analysis and an institutional disinterestedness in legal
reform. The legal scholarship too often seems to view law in a vacuum,
a practice that results in masking the underlying forces and values that
shape the development of legal principles. This approach is, however,
consistent with the interests of the legal profession in maintaining a system,
which because of its intricacy, reinforces dependence upon lawyers'
services in property transactions.
In the landlord-tenant context, the scholarship evidences an insti-
tutional will to continue to regard law and the legal process as essentially
neutral and impartial in the resolution of disputes; there is also a desire
to eschew the underlying economic forces within which legal rules have
been negotiated or adopted, and according to which disputes are resolved.
There seems little awareness in the legal scholarship of the extraordinary
rise in the numbers of Canadians who look to residential leaseholds as
their life-long shelter and the impact of this branch of law upon the
actual relations between landlords and tenants. The possibility that the
law of landlord and tenant needs to be examined, taking account of
governmental housing policies generally and the private investment
market, seems as obvious as is the absence of such examination from
legal scholarship.
Finally, the matrimonial property context confronts the limits of
traditional property analysis. In implementing a statutory scheme for
dividing property upon marriage breakdown, judges truly perform the
role of redistributive justice when they transfer title on the basis of equity
arising out of the marriage relationship. In this respect, the legal principles
declare that the traditional principles of property, which presumably are
rationally based, are to be superseded by principles based on equity
between a husband and a wife. The major effect of such statutes is to
confer property rights on those with the status of wives, a status that
barely one hundred years ago deprived its holder of any property interest
whatsoever. To the extent that the scholarship generally fails to take
account of the radical nature of matrimonial property principles, it is
not difficult to understand why it is not confronted more successfully.
Thus, it seems that much of the scholarship on property is essentially
doctrinal rather than normative, comparative; or interdisciplinary. It is
also fragmented and specialized rather than synthesized and theoretical.
And it is mainly directed to those who are legally trained rather than
to others. What conclusions should we draw from these observations?
The conclusions should not necessarily be negative. In terms of the
training and experience of most legal writers, their writing reflects what
they are best able to do: analyse and explicate abstract and rational
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principles about a process for decision making that is insulated from
social, economic, and political forces, and in which disputes are resolved
by neutral rules applied with fairness and objectivity.8, That this process
is mythical8s does not necessarily detract from its internal coherence. And
its internal coherence must offer some solace to even the most jaded
philosopher.
Yet there is a crisis: a demand that property law demonstrate
coherence to the external (non-legal) world and that principles of property
law be adapted to provide protection for new interests, including those
of tenants; and wives on marriage breakdown. On one hand, a rational,
logical analysis leads inevitably to the conclusion that 'new property'
claims can be sustained just as easily as more traditional ones.86 Because
'property' is simply a conceptual construct of law, there is no logical
reason to deny 'new property' claims. However, the structure of our society
cannot admit new claims without (inevitably) modifying older ones
because the concept of property is essentially a distributive mechanism
for society's benefits. The extension of the property concept to benefit
all individuals stretches classic J.S. Mill liberalism to an Orwellian
egalitarian checkmate:
... the crisis is a crisis in the individualistic view of society, in a legal model
attuned to the needs of the individual house- or property-holder, the entrepreneur,
the settled citizen living on terms of equality with those around him, secure and
confident as an individual in his bearing vis-t-vis the state and the rest of society.
Against this, the new demands elevate the interests or 'requirements' of the
comparatively poor and/or underprivileged as contrasted with those who are 'at
home' with law; they pit the interests of 'society' or of 'humanity' against 'excessive'
respect for abstract individual rights and powers, especially proprietorial rights
and powers .... 87
Yet any suggestion that the 'new property' claims should be rejected
in order to preserve the integrity of the concept sounds suspiciously like
84 This view has been subjected to critical assessment most recently by feminists: see Olsen,
supra. note 68 and MacKinnon, supra; note 33.
85 The idea of "myth" is derived from the analysis of "the myth of judicial neutrality" in
A. Sachs & J. Hoff Wilson, Sexism and the Law (1978).
86 See C.B. MacPherson, supra, note 17 at 201:
... property, although it must always be an individual right, need not be confined, as liberal
theory has confined it, to a right to exclude others from the use or benefit of some thing,
but may equally be an individual right not to be excluded by others from the use or benefit
of some thing. When property is so understood, the problem of liberal-democratic theory
is no longer a problem of putting limits on the property right, but of supplementing the
individual right not to be excluded by others .... The right not to be excluded by others
may provisionally be stated as the individual right to equal access to the means of labour
and/or the means of life.
87 E. Kamenka & A. Tay, "Beyond Bourgeois Individualism: The Contemporary Crisis in Law
and Legal Ideology" in Kamenka & Neale, eds., supra, note 45 at 129-30.
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an argument in favour of the status quo, in other words, the protection
of existing property interests.
What does seem necessary, however, is a recognition that societal
changes external to the legal system now make the property concept
less and less a matter of only 'private law':
There is ... a shift of attention from the property whose paradigm is the house-
hold, the walled-in or marked-off piece of land ... to the corporation, the hospital,
the defence establishment.., whose 'property' spreads throughout the society and
whose existence is dependent upon subsidies, state protection, public provision
of facilities, etc.... Property becomes social in the sense that its base and its
effects can no longer be contained within the framework of the traditional picture.88
Thus, property has become public rather than private and so pervasive
that the fragmentation and specialization of scholarship are not only
inevitable but perhaps a necessity. Yet the need to take the measure
of the individual parts to the whole remains. The task is unenviable,
since it must by nature be concerned not just with internal consistency
but also must meet the demands of ideas external to the law itself.
The complexity of the demands means that it is unlikely that any
one scholar, or type of scholar, can perform the whole task. Both those
who are legally trained and those trained in other disciplines may
participate; scholars with experience of 'law in action' and those without
it may all offer useful insights. What also seems essential is that legal
scholars develop self-awareness of the perspective from which they write,
of the underlying values and assumptions they bring to the task, and
of the limits of rational argument in legal discourse. To argue that the
law's internal coherence is alone sufficient no longer seems persuasive;
yet to prefer other frameworks for analysis, without critical inquiry into
their underlying rationales, seems equally inappropriate to scholarly
inquiry. The real task is the critical assessment of why choices among
ideas are made and advanced by scholars.
In the context of this assessment of property scholarship in Canada,
it is clearly evident that my experience and understanding of law as
it impacts on those at the margins of society inform my critique of the
scholarly writing and my assessment of appropriate directions for future
change. What is interesting to me is that perceptions of law differ so
greatly among legal scholars, nearly all of whom were trained in a country
where legal education has been remarkably homogeneous for several
decades;89 does this not itself suggest the mythical nature of the idea
of the law's neutrality? My experience is that law is seldom neutral and
88 Ibid. at 133.
89 See supra, note 36 at ch. 2.
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that it may even be humane rather than objective on occasion. Surely
legal scholarship, as well as law, should be informed by experience as
well as logic.90
What seems most critical for the future of property scholarship is
to focus attention on these issues in the classroom, and to help students
to appreciate the experiential nature of legal ideas and not just their
content. On this basis, it still seems necessary to 'look to the law teachers',
not to codify the traditional principles, as Professor Laskin suggested
twenty years ago, but rather to construct Blackacre's new horizons for
the twenty-first century.
90 See O.W. Holmes: "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience" in
The Common Law (1881). Feminist legal theorists agree that experience and not just logic should
inform the law, but assert that women's experience should also be central to legal interpretation
and decision making. Other writers deny the importance of experience; see for example, Sir Edward
Coke: "Reason is the life of the law; nay, the common law itself is nothing else but reason....
The law, which is perfection of reason", in Frst Institute (16th century).
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